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This article proposes a novel reading of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. 
Adorno’s emblematic book Dialectic of Enlightenment(1947). Horkheimer and 
Adorno took as their starting point the observation that modern liberal, human 
and social progress has tipped over into a new form of barbarism but explicitly 
refused to develop it into a rejection of the enlightenment and its values as such. 
Instead, the dialectical view seeks even in the darkest moment of the failure of 
civilization, which is here epitomized in the Holocaust, reasons to defend a 
self-reflective, more enlightened form of human civilization. The dialectical 
theory does not reject but rearticulates the idea of progress that remains central 
to most forms of liberal and socialist theory. One of the central questions is, 
under what conditions do the instruments of enlightenment and civilization, 
including scientific and technological rationality, social organisation and general 
productivity, serve either emancipation or barbarism. Warding off the positivistic 
attack on any form of metaphysics and utopian thinking, Horkheimer and Adorno 
emphasised the need for enlightenment to be based on non-empiricist, 
reality-transcending, critical thinking in order to be in the service of emanci-
pation rather than domination. The human mind atrophies when deprived of its 
freedom of movement. The more abstract, philosophical argument of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is developed through several more historically specific materials, 
one of which is the interpretation of modern antisemitism. Horkheimer and 
Adorno combine in this context a Marxist analysis of aspects of continuity 
between liberal and fascist governance, based on the concepts of the 
commodity-form and the wage-form of modern social relations, with an 
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anthropological interpretation of pogroms and genocide as ‘rituals of 
civilization’. Civilization aims at the liberation of human life from labour but 
does so by way of organizing and intensifying labour, discipline and identity, 
generating resentment as well as streamlining and destroying thought. 
Civilization thus produces furious anger both at those deemed to represent more 
‘primitive’ levels of civilization and at those perceived as driving it. 
Nevertheless, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that enlightenment itself produces 
the means to overcome its own entrapment. The ‘forces and things’ it produces 
serve domination but also encourage humans to overcome domination: the 
reification of the means of domination – knowledge, in particular – mediates, 
moderates and potentially democratizes power.
Key words: Adorno, alienation, antisemitism, capitalism, civilization, 
Comte, emancipation, enlightenment, fascism, Horkheimer, Keats, la-
bour, liberalism, magic, Maurras, metaphysics, mimesis, positivism, ra-
tionality, reification, socialism, technology
Underneath a surface of granite pessimism, Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
emblematic book Dialectic of Enlightenment (1987 [1947]) hides elements of 
a strangely sanguine theory that still wait to be discovered.1) In the preface, 
1) Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments was written between 1941 and 
1944 in Los Angeles by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in close coopera-
tion, also involving Gretel Karplus-Adorno, who typed both men’s dictations, and 
Leo Löwenthal, who contributed to the first three sections of chapter five, ‘Elements 
of Antisemitism’. Five-hundred mimeographed copies of a first version were in-
formally distributed in 1944 under the title Philosophical Fragments. The 
Amsterdam publisher Querido Verlag, a leading publisher of German-language exile 
literature, published the book under its final title, Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Philosophical Fragments, in 1947. The word ‘enlightenment’ means both the specif-
ic eighteenth-century movement of that name and a general notion of incrementally, 
albeit not linearly, progressing self-consciousness observable throughout human 
history. The body of the work consists of five chapters and a final section of twen-
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Horkheimer and Adorno state that the aim of the book is ‘to explain why hu-
manity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of 
barbarism’ (1987: 16). This addresses the dialectic flagged up in the title of 
the book. The important bit here is the ‘instead of’: the reality of barbarism 
was undeniable and clearly visible, but the originality of the formulation lies 
in its implication that humanity could have been expected to enter ‘a truly 
human state’ sometime earlier in the twentieth century, leaving behind its 
not-so-human state. The promise of progress towards humanity, held by 
(most) socialists and (some) liberals, blew up in their faces with a 
vengeance. It would have been easy and straightforward then to write a book 
arguing against the holding of such hope, but this would not have been a dia-
lectical book. Dialectic of Enlightenment undertakes to rescue this hope by 
examining why and how progress tipped over into its opposite. Its title refer-
ences the book’s principal proposition: ‘enlightenment’ contains both the 
seeds of its own destruction and the potential of an escape route from that 
destruction. Horkheimer and Adorno state this unequivocally in the preface: 
the critique of the enlightenment ‘is intended to prepare a positive concept of 
ty-four short pieces (‘Notes and Sketches’) that pick up various aspects of the 
argument. The first chapter of the book is ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’. It is fol-
lowed by two chapters that are designated as ‘excursus’, or digressions, related to 
different aspects of the first chapter. The fourth chapter, ‘Culture Industry: 
Enlightenment as Mass Deception’, was also initially intended to be an excursus. 
The fifth chapter is ‘Elements of Antisemitism: Limits of Enlightenment’. The writ-
ing generally refuses the linear logic expected of regular academic philosophy. 
Instead, each section starts with a fragmentary perspective, explores its contra-
dictions, suddenly comes to a halt and moves on to another fragment to the effect 
that similar arguments are made from only slightly differing angles using different 
fragments of empirical or historical material. This unusually open style is related to 
Horkheimer’s understanding of ‘dialectic’ as the refusal to treat any phenomena in a 
reductionist manner. Horkheimer developed the dialectical conception of thinking 
about history and society as a dynamic and contradictory totality in a series of essays 
in the 1930s.
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enlightenment which liberates it from its entanglement in blind domi-
nation’(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1987: 21). Different from most extant in-
terpretations, this article aims at a reading of the book that takes this stated 
intention at its word and looks for traces of the concept of ‘liberated’ en-
lightenment that Horkheimer and Adorno wished to ‘prepare’, and that is to-
day as urgently needed as at any previous time.
Horkheimer and Adorno looked for a position from which to confront fas-
cism and found that ‘in reflecting on its own guilt’, thought finds that it lacks 
a language (1987: 18). This is the book’s painful starting point as described 
in the preface. In the name of what exactly is it possible to challenge fascism 
effectively? In the languages of sociology, psychology, history, philosophy? 
The discourses of truth, freedom, human rights? Here is the rub: in the peri-
od in which fascism took power these sounded hollow as they had been 
stripped of their authority. If this sounds familiar, it is because we are, almost 
a century later, in a not so different situation. Horkheimer and Adorno state 
that fascist demagogues and liberal intellectuals feed off the same (positivist) 
zeitgeist, marked by the ‘self-destruction of the enlightenment’. Science and 
scholarship are not potent weapons against fascism anymore, and this even 
affects tendencies that are opposed to ‘official’, positivistic science. The ba-
sic point here is that scientific, materialist, technological rationality is a force 
for good only when it is linked to the idealistic notion of general human 
emancipation, the goal of full rich lives for all without suffering, exploitation 
and oppression. (Using a word they had good reasons to avoid at the time, 
this is what Marx would have called ‘communism’). Only this link gives em-
pirical and rationalist science its truth and significance: enlightenment needs 
to be ‘transcendental’, i.e. something that points beyond the actually existing 
reality, not unlike metaphysics in traditional philosophy. It needs to be crit-
ical, that is, in opposition to reality as it is. The principal thesis of the book is 
that enlightenment purged itself of this connection to society-transcending, 
214  2019년 제16권 제2호
non-empirical, critical truth, and as early as on the second page of the pref-
ace Horkheimer and Adorno name the thinker who exemplifies for them this 
fatal development: Auguste Comte, the founder of positivist philosophy 
(1987, 17). They assert that in the hostile and brutal conditions of the eight-
eenth century – the period often described as that of ‘the Enlightenment’ – 
philosophy had dared to challenge the ‘infamy’ (as Voltaire called it) of the 
church and the society it helped maintain, while in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution philosophy switched sides and put itself at the service of 
the state. This was of course, by now, the modernising state, but ― dialecti-
cally speaking ― as much a different state as still the same state. They write 
that the Comtean school of positivism ― ‘apologists’ of the modern, capital-
ist society that emerged in the nineteenth century ― ‘usurped’ the succession 
to the genuine Enlighteners, and reconciled philosophy with the forces it pre-
viously had opposed, such as the Catholic church. Horkheimer and Adorno 
mention in this context the ultra-nationalist organisation Action Française, 
whose chief ideologist Charles Maurras had been an ardent admirer of 
Comte. This hint helps understand what kind of historical developments they 
had on their minds: while Comte surely saw himself in good faith as a pro-
tagonist of social reform meant to overcome-but-preserve the achievements 
of the Revolution, and his translation of enlightenment empiricism into the 
system of ‘positivist philosophy’ as a contribution to the process of modern-
ization, his followers in many ways and to varying degrees contributed to the 
development of the modern authoritarian state and, as in the case of Maurras, 
proto-fascism. The elements of these subsequent developments can be found 
in Comte’s own writings, which makes his ambiguities a suitable illustration 
of the dialectic of enlightenment.2)
2) On this see Stoetzler (2014). The Action Française is mentioned only in the in-
formally circulated version of the text that was published in 1944, not in the defini-
tive publication of 1947. The 1987 edition of Dialectic of Enlightenment by Schmid 
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As elsewhere in Horkheimer and Adorno’s writings, there is a lot of po-
lemic against ‘positivism’ in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Mostly the target of 
their critique is the ‘logical positivism’ of their own time, but they seem to 
see the latter as a logical extension or modification of the older Comtean 
positivism that was a much more ambitious and comprehensive proposition. 
There is no detailed engagement with Comte but the principal point of attack 
seems to be Comte’s rejection of metaphysics: when the eighteenth-century 
enlightenment combined empiricism with rationalism, Comte aimed to boil 
it down to strictly positivist empiricism that observes the ‘positively’ givens 
(nowadays better known under their Latin name: data) and derives ‘laws’ 
from them that can be used to predict and adapt to, perchance slightly tweak, 
whatever reality has in store for us. The metaphysical ideas that had been 
useful in bringing down feudalism and the old regime ― the likes of free-
dom, individualism, emancipation ―  need to be abandoned as they are the 
playthings of troublemakers, irritants that could endanger the consolidation 
of the post-revolutionary new order. Positivism in Comte’s sense is essen-
tially the scientific basis of governance by experts, while twentieth-century 
‘logical positivism’ is its epistemological complement. When Horkheimer 
and Adorno attack the latter, they see it as continuous with the former. The 
attack on metaphysics was a central theme of German philosophy in the 
1920s, and helped weaken the defences against fascism across the political 
spectrum. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the positivistic cult of facts 
and probabilities has flushed out conceptual thinking, and as humans gen-
erally have a need to explain to themselves conceptually why they should ac-
tually do something, or resist doing something that society expects them to 
do, the denunciation and elimination of concepts as ‘metaphysical’ promotes 
a fatalistic going-with-the-flow: the ‘blocking of the theoretical imagination 
Noerr provides the variants in the footnotes.
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has paved the way for political delusion’, which in the context meant fas-
cism (1987: 18).
At the same time, though, many contemporaries argued for the re-
construction of some kind of metaphysical system, be it theological, 
neo-Platonic or neo-Aristotelian. In the context of WWII such philosophical 
or theological systems would have been attractive as something to hold on 
to: they can help one to weather the brute modernizing nihilism of the fascist 
barbarians, and after their defeat provide a handy identity narrative. The easy 
option of a return to traditional metaphysics was not open, though, to the 
Frankfurt School theorists who saw themselves within the tradition of the 
radical strand of the Enlightenment. Their main thrust was to attack the lat-
ter’s domesticated version, the ‘positivism’ that puts itself and its expertise 
at the service of domination. Far from writing against the Enlightenment, 
they wanted to restore it to its complex form that contained traces of the 
transcendental that Comte ― quite correctly ― saw as trouble. They wanted 
to be the troublemakers whom the positivists thought they had exorcised 
from the Enlightenment.
As Horkheimer and Adorno state, the ‘self-destruction of enlightenment’ 
frustrated the writing of the book they initially had in mind ― a monograph 
on the role of dialectical logic in a variety of academic disciplines ― but 
came to provide the principal subject matter of the book they wrote instead. 
Dialectic of Enlightenment asserts that ‘thinking that aims at enlightenment’ 
is inseparably linked to freedom in society, but admits that enlightenment al-
so ‘already contains the germ of the regression which is taking place every-
where today’ (18). Theirs is the project of an enlightenment mindful of its 
contradictions, as opposed to a smug and arrogant one that happily and ex-
pertly lectures the unwashed and the unenlightened. 
Its precariousness and fragility are expressed strikingly on the very last 
pages of the book, in the last of the twenty-four ‘Notes and Sketches’, titled 
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‘On the genesis of stupidity’ (288-290). This short text begins with an arrest-
ing image: ‘The emblem of intelligence is the antenna of the snail’ (288). 
Horkheimer and Adorno do not provide any reference in support of this 
claim, but one could think for example of a famous letter by Keats that men-
tions the ‘trembling and delicate snail-horn perception of beauty’.3) The an-
tenna, or horn, of the snail represents the good kind of enlightenment we 
should aspire to: trembling and delicate, as in Keats. Horkheimer and 
Adorno use the image, though, to make an anthropological argument about 
the emergence of intelligence: Meeting an obstacle, the antenna is immedi-
ately withdrawn into the protection of the body, it becomes one with the 
whole until it ventures forth again only timidly as an independent organ. If 
the danger is still present, it disappears once more, and the intervals between 
the attempts grow longer (288). 
They argue here that the development of human mental life is precariously 
physical and depends on the freedom to exercise the organs of perception. 
Evolution only takes place when ‘antennae were once stretched out in new 
directions and not repulsed’. Stupidity, by contrast, ‘is a scar’: ‘Every partial 
stupidity in a human being marks a spot where the awakening play of mus-
cles has been inhibited instead of fostered’ (289). Switching to a psycho-
analytical argument, Horkheimer and Adorno write that the inhibition leads 
3) Horkheimer and Adorno quote from Goethe’s Faust (Part 1, line 4068), where 
Mephistopheles talks about the ‘fumbling face’ of a snail. Closer in meaning to how 
they use the image is, though, a formulation by John Keats who wrote about “that 
trembling and delicate snail-horn perception of beauty” in a letter from 1818 (letter 
to Haydon, April 8, 1818 [http://keats-poems.com/to-benjamin-robert-haydon-teign-
mouth-april-8-1818/]). In another letter, Keats quotes a passage from Shakespeare’s 
Venus and Adonis that conveys exactly what Horkheimer and Adorno say here: “As 
the snail, whose tender horns being hit,/ Shrinks back into his shelly cave with pain/ 
And there all smothered up in shade doth sit,/ Long after fearing to put forth again...” 
(Venus and Adonis, verse 175 [https://englishhistory.net/keats/letters/j-h-reynolds- 
22-november-1817/; http://shakespeare.mit.edu/Poetry/VenusAndAdonis.html]).
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to automatized repetitions of the aborted attempt, such as in neurotic repeti-
tions of a ‘defence reaction which has already proved futile’, and ultimately 
produces a numb spot where the scar is, a deformation. All the deformations 
we accumulate during individual and species evolution translate into 
well-adapted, functioning ‘characters’, stupidity, impotence or spiteful fanat-
icism, or any combination. They are so many monuments to arrested hope. 
This is how the book ends: it is implied that the answer to stupidity, includ-
ing those of fascism and antisemitism, but also their contemporary second 
cousins such as ‘post-truth’, resentment-driven politics from Hindutva to 
Brexit, those myriads of irrational particularisms that gang up on particulars 
and individuals, ultimately can be defeated only by more freedom of move-
ment for our antennas and other muscles, and the production of fewer scars 
on our various tissues. 
Antisemitism and civilization
‘The genesis of stupidity’ could also be understood as an alternative take 
on the general theme of the book. The one ‘stupidity’ that receives the most 
detailed treatment in the book is antisemitism. The fifth chapter of Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, ‘Elements of antisemitism. Limits of Enlightenment’, is 
the most complex text ever written on this particular subject. Like the book 
as a whole, it intermeshes the critique of the present ― capitalist modernity 
―with the much grander theme of the critique of human civilization. 
Horkheimer and Adorno do not in fact say a lot about antisemitism in the 
perspective of the capitalist present: most points on this are made on the first 
few pages of the chapter. Unsuspecting liberal readers must have experi-
enced these like a slap in the face, though: the argument emphasizes the con-
tinuity between liberal and fascist governance and the responsibility of the 
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bourgeoisie. First of all, liberals and the representatives of the ‘democratic- 
popular movements’ had always been lukewarm at best about the equality of 
Jews who seemed less than totally assimilated. Fascism is then described as 
the modern bourgeoisie’s move towards ‘regression to naked domination’, 
whereby the liberal notion of the ‘harmony of society’ (the harmonious 
give-and-take of a market-based society) morphed into a Volksgemeinschaft, 
i.e. the nation that declares itself to be ‘race’ (198-199). Fascism openly re-
veals and celebrates what had been the essence of society anyway: violence 
that distorts human beings. Those who had embraced the more idealistic as-
pects of liberalism only made themselves more helpless when they had to 
face up to its unvarnished reality: these were nice ideals to have, but poten-
tially self-defeating in practice. This analysis was seriously out of step with 
the emergent intellectual life of a post-fascist Germany that hoped simply to 
return to its previous liberal and democratic better self, as if the latter’s total 
collapse had just been an unfortunate accident.
Although probably the best-known part of the argument, the critique of 
liberalism and the bourgeoisie is only a minor point here, though: for 
Marxists it was hardly shocking news that liberalism can morph into fas-
cism, usually fails to put up much of a defence against it, and that the ruling 
class will encourage the subalterns to embrace any kind of vicious and vio-
lent ideology if they deem it useful to maintain their grip on power. These 
were part of the necessary but not sufficient preconditions for the emergence 
of the exterminatory antisemitism of the Nazis. These points on their own 
were not sufficient to explain a pogrom, and certainly not the Holocaust. 
This is the point at which Horkheimer and Adorno shift their argument from 
‘modern bourgeois society’ to ‘human civilization’ as the framework of ex-
planation: the antisemitic pogrom is described as ‘a luxury’ (given that the 
material gain for the immediate perpetrators usually was slim) and ‘a ritual 
of civilization’ (200). With ‘ritual’ and ‘civilization’ the argument enters the 
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territory of anthropology. The point here is that the dynamic of con-
temporary capitalist society mobilizes forces that can be described and un-
derstood only with the help of categories of more historical depth than those 
of capitalist society itself. This does not, though, mean a turn away from the 
language of Marxism: ‘civilization’ and ‘society’ are not alternative objects 
of study – the point is that either dimension can be understood only through 
the other. Human civilization exists in the present only in the form of capital-
ist society; capitalist society is nothing other than human civilization in its 
current form.4) 
The core of the argument relating to modern society is derived directly 
from Marx’s critique of political economy: capitalist society maintains the 
‘socially necessary illusion’ that the wage-relationship is (in principle, or po-
tentially) ‘fair’, i.e. an exchange of equivalent values: this much la-
bour-power for this much money. Nevertheless, social inequality is an only 
too obvious reality. To the untrained eye, inequality seems to be brought 
about in the sphere of circulation (as opposed to the sphere of production), 
say, at the supermarket till where it becomes manifest how much produce 
one’s wages will buy. Marx argues that the apparent fairness of the wage re-
lationship itself presupposes exploitation that is expressed as the difference 
between the ‘exchange value’ of labour power (represented by the wage) and 
its ‘use-value’ (represented by the product that it produced): the product pro-
duced by X amount of labour power must be higher than the wage paid for it 
because this is where the profit for the capitalist comes from. Admittedly this 
4) The relationship between these two concepts can be conceived in a way similar to 
that between capitalism and patriarchy: they are not different ‘things’ but the former 
is the contemporary form of appearance of the latter, while the latter is undergirding 
the former. Here, too, the strategic hope of progressives is that capitalist modernity 
impacts and transforms its substratum, patriarchal civilization, so thoroughly that it 
allows for the emergence of the post-capitalist non-patriarchy we would like to see.
Learning from the power of things  221
explanation ― one of the centrepieces of Marxist theory ― flies in the face 
of ‘common sense’ everyday consciousness where the notion of ‘a fair 
wage’ reigns supreme ― not least because we tend to invoke the ideology of 
‘fairness’ when we engage in a wage struggle. (When in an industrial dispute 
we ask for more than what is deemed ‘fair’ we are called ‘greedy’, which 
implies immorality, and forfeit the sympathy of ‘the public’.) Capitalist com-
mon sense, including the ideology of ‘fairness’, produces thus the need for 
another explanation for inequality and exploitation, and helpfully the capital-
ist exploiters, ‘masquerading as producers’, shout ‘thief!’ and point at ‘the 
merchants’ and other representatives of the sphere of circulation. This line of 
argument, up to this point, has of course nothing in itself to do with anti-
semitism: in developed capitalism, the exploitative character of the mode of 
production tends to be deflected onto (real or imagined) agents of circu-
lation, and many forms of (supposed) ‘anti-capitalism’ reflect this. As 
Horkheimer and Adorno put it, ‘the merchant is the bailiff of the whole sys-
tem and takes the hatred for the other [exploiters] upon himself’.5) Which 
category of people is cast as this particular type of scapegoat is entirely de-
pendent on historical context; in Christian Europe, this mechanism of capi-
talist-anticapitalist ideology found in ‘the Jews’ an ideal object and thus re-
vived and reinvented, as modern antisemitism, pre-existing traditions of 
Jew-hatred.6)
5) This aspect of antisemitism can be understood as a particular version of what later 
came to be known more generically as ‘middleman minority’ hostility. Bonacich 
notes that ‘the Jews in Europe’ are ‘perhaps the epitome of the form’ and mentions 
as other examples ‘the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Asians in East Africa, Armenians 
in Turkey, Syrians in West Africa, Parsis in India, Japanese and Greeks in the United 
States’ and others (Bonacich, 1973: 583).
6) Modern antisemitism was exported all over the world in the hand luggage of im-
perialism and on arrival, somewhat ironically, sometimes became an element of what 
could be called the ‘anti-imperialism of fools’. 
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This, the Marxist theory of antisemitism, is contained in very condensed 
form on some of the first pages of ‘Elements of antisemitism’. Taken on its 
own, this theory only explains antisemitism as a set of ideas, a particular 
misguided way of thinking about capitalism. Insofar as these ideas are quite 
fixed, they form an attitude or a mental pattern. Ideas and attitudes alone do 
not make anyone act, though, and the monstrous antisemitic acts of the 
Holocaust need several more layers of explanation. Nazi antisemitism mobi-
lized a deep-seated force that turned antisemitism into an irrational ob-
session, even though often executed with rational deliberation, that far sur-
passed the misguided social protest as which it may have started in most in-
dividuals: the delusion of a moral duty to save the world by identifying, 
chasing and killing Jews wherever they are, at whatever price. One of the 
ideas with which Horkheimer and Adorno respond to this theoretical need is 
that of the pogrom as a ‘ritual of civilization’ (200). Antisemitism as de-
scribed above gave form and direction to the murderous obsession ― it 
pointed to who the victims should be and why they deserved what they got 
― but it did not in fact cause it. Ideas can trigger, guide and justify, but do 
not cause actions. The dynamism of the action itself needs a deeper-level ex-
planation that sits at the level of civilizational or anthropological theory ―
the dialectical theory of rationality that is the central theme of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. This distinction is important because it has crucial practical 
implications: even the smartest rational explanations do not usually help 
much with antisemites ‘because rationality as entangled with domination is 
itself at the root of the malady’. If antisemitism and other maladies are in 
fact phobias against rationality, rationality will not suffice as a weapon 
against them. Only reflection on the entanglement itself would help: is there 
perhaps good reason to be suspicious of reason? With this question, 
‘Elements of antisemitism’ feeds back into the general theme of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.
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In the philosophical tradition that Horkheimer and Adorno come from and 
that includes Hegel and Marx, ‘reason’ is not a value-neutral concept. What 
is reasonable is not simply ‘whatever works’ (efficiently, instrumentally) but 
whatever serves human emancipation and autonomy. Rationality understood 
in this way has an element of transcendence ― some kind of going-beyond 
the bad reality as it exists ― that is not entirely different from that found in 
religion. Indeed Horkheimer and Adorno write that before it was reduced to 
being a cultural artefact – an aspect of a society’s way of life, something 
that society’s administrators consider useful for holding society together – 
religion contained both, truth and deception (206). The truth of religion had 
been the longing for redemption, and this truth lived on in philosophical 
idealism. Positivism, in turn, exorcized the longing from philosophy and re-
duced truth one-dimensionally to the depiction of the world as it actually ― 
presumably ― is. Spirit, enlightenment, civilization became dispirited. 
Enlightenment minus the spirit of longing ―  utopia, the ability to imagine 
something better ― becomes a self-hating and self-destructing enlighten-
ment.
Labour and civilization, mimesis and magic
Whereas civilization and enlightenment are defined as the continuous ef-
fort of humanity to escape the dull circularity of reproduction and self-pres-
ervation, in reality its efforts increasingly went into perfecting humanity’s 
means of reproduction and self-preservation (in other words: labour; the 
economy). In order to free ourselves from having to work a lot, humanity 
had to work a lot so as to develop the means of production (knowledge, ex-
perience, science, technology, social organisation) which are indeed an im-
portant part of what we commonly call ‘civilization’. Horkheimer and 
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Adorno’s basic point is quite simple: far from rejecting civilization, we have 
to rebalance it as it has become an end in itself. Humanity has developed 
civilization, productivity, technology, society in order to spend more time 
lazing about on the beach, and after all we went through, humanity is more 
than entitled now to cash in the chips. The reality of the dialectic of enlight-
enment is, though, that the closer we actually come to leading the life of 
Riley the further it seems out of reach, and chances are that by the time we 
sort this out beaches may be no more. 
In ‘Elements of antisemitism’, Horkheimer and Adorno focus on one par-
ticular aspect of this dialectic: the idea that modern civilization develops a 
destructive fury against the ‘anachronistic’ remnants of its own initial stages, 
including mimesis and magic. Mimesis is the effort of a living creature to 
mimic its natural environment as a survival strategy and is discussed by an-
thropologists as one of the oldest aspects of human civilization: humans try 
to pacify a dangerous animal by ‘being’ that animal in a ritual dance, for 
example. Horkheimer and Adorno discuss this as the beginning of the proc-
ess of enlightenment: we mimic nature to escape its domination (210-216). 
Similarly, sacrificing an animal in order to make the gods grant rainfall or 
success in warfare is a form of barter, i.e. an early form of rationality, espe-
cially as the clever humans hope the deal will have them receive something 
much more valuable than what they sacrifice. It is not difficult to recognize 
some of our own supposedly ‘modern’ behaviour in those supposedly 
‘primitive’ practices. One of the key arguments in ‘Elements of anti-
semitism’ is that every time civilization progresses from one stage to the 
next, it comes to hate everything that recalls the previous stage: in a very 
general sense, the ‘civilized’ hate (and exterminate) the ‘savages’ because 
the latter remind the former that they are but one step ahead, and that it 
would not take much to regress into the more ‘primitive’ state (witness 
Marlon Brando in Apocalypse Now). Perhaps we even have a secret desire to 
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go back to being ‘savages’: after all, the life of a hunter-gatherer might well 
be preferable to the average office job. Because the civilized paid a high 
price to get this far, they fortify themselves against the threat of regression. 
Many aspects of racism can be related to this. Antisemites like to shudder in 
fear of supposed Jewish superiority and secret world domination, but at the 
same time antisemitism shares with other forms of racism the projection of 
aspects of ‘savagery’ onto ‘the Jews’. The most obvious case is their accusa-
tion of ritual murder, but there are other things that antisemites assert they 
find unpleasant or disgusting about ‘the Jews’, and many of these are, in a 
sense, ‘primitive’: energetic gesticulating, which is often seen as somehow 
‘typically Jewish’, is a form of mimetic behaviour as the physical movement 
paints a picture of an emotional state (213). The big noses ‘the Jews’ suppos-
edly have point to a more primitive stage of development where the sense of 
smell was still more important than the other senses (whereas in modernity 
smell, as well as being smelly, is tabooed; against all scientific evidence, in 
bourgeois society smelling of garlic is not the signature of a healthy diet but 
of cultural backwardness). Horkheimer and Adorno point to a bitter irony 
here: not only was the religion of Judaism in fact very much driven by the 
overcoming of magic and mimesis (such as in the ban on images), it is the 
antisemites who indulge in echoes of magic and mimesis in their love of rit-
uals, sacrifices, formulas and uniforms. The prosecution and destruction of 
those accused of mimetic, primitive behaviour provides the supposedly civi-
lized with a splendid opportunity to indulge in lots of mimetic and primitive 
behaviour (214). 
The principal argument, though, is that the latest stage of the process of 
civilization is marked by the destruction of the capability of thinking itself: 
highly advanced stupidity. In prehistory, people’s encounters with animals 
not noted for carefully pondering the pros and cons of eating humans re-
quired equally unhesitating decisions: shoot the poisoned arrow or run fast. 
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No time for dialectics here (53). Civilization decimated troublesome animals 
and other immediate threats and was thus free to create institutions of media-
tion that slowed things down and made space for the new activities of judg-
ing and reasoning. Late-industrial society, though, has brought about ‘a re-
gression to judgment without judging’: legal process is made short work of 
in kangaroo courts, cognition is emptied of active reflection and likes to 
jump to conclusions, and thinking as a specialized profession becomes a 
luxury that ‘must not be tempted … to draw any awkward conclusions’ 
(233). 
Learning from the power of things
Nevertheless, the very last sentence of ‘Elements of antisemitism’ ― and 
therewith the last sentence of Dialectic of Enlightenment, apart from the 
‘Notes and Sketches’ ― is guardedly optimistic: ‘Enlightenment itself, hav-
ing come into its own and thereby turning into a force, could break through 
the limits of enlightenment’ (1987: 238). The grounds for this surprisingly 
hopeful turn are laid out in the concluding pages of the first chapter, ‘The 
concept of enlightenment’, which contains the book’s core argument. Here, 
in particular in the concluding three paragraphs of the chapter (1987: 60-66), 
Horkheimer and Adorno assert in the purest, most idealistic spirit of the 
Enlightenment that thinking is, after all, ‘the servant whom the master can-
not control at will’ (60). Even though enlightenment serves domination, it is 
bound to turn against domination sooner or later. The bringer of hope is 
here, rather unexpectedly, the very thing that tends to figure as evil incarnate 
in most forms of ‘critique of civilization’ on the left as on the right: 
reification. 
The argument centres here on the observation that domination has 
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‘reified’ itself (which means, made itself into a series of things) by taking on 
the forms of law and organisation, and in the process limited itself. These in-
struments ‘mediate’ domination, that is, they organize and actualize but also 
moderate exploitation which through mediation loses its immediacy: ‘The 
moment of rationality in domination also asserts itself as something different 
from [domination]’ (60). The object-like quality of the means of domination 
― language, weapons, machines, thought ―makes these means universally 
available for everyone, including those resisting or fighting domination. 
Also this is, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument, part of the dialectic of 
enlightenment: although in the capitalist present, thought may become me-
chanical, and today’s machines mutilate their operators, ‘in the form of ma-
chines … alienated reason moves toward a society which reconciles thought 
… with the liberated living beings’ (60). Dialectic of Enlightenment appears 
here, on closer reading, to have anticipated some of the emphatic optimism 
that decades later accompanied the discussions of the internet as somehow 
intrinsically communistic, as in the enthusiastic discussions around share-
ware for example, and more recent suggestions that the latest round of tech-
nological innovation will abolish most capitalist labour and force humanity 
to advance to a truly human society ― unless, though, it first regresses to the 
barbarism of a neo-feudal or neo-caste system. 
Horkheimer and Adorno assert that although industrial capitalism means 
the disempowerment of the workers, this is not, as it were, set in stone 
(1987: 60). The element that would empower the workers to end domination 
is, in sturdy idealist fashion, their ability to think. The human capacity to 
think is not necessarily subservient to power, quite to the contrary: the mas-
ter’s tools are in fact needed to undo the master’s house. Horkheimer and 
Adorno celebrate here the positive upshots of reification and alienation: they 
argue not only that the instruments (guns, etc.) can be turned around but that 
their object-like, thing-like character asks for it. It is in this sense that prog-
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ress, by way of being the progress of domination, is also the progress of the 
negation of domination ―which is, of course, just what the phrase ‘dialectic 
of enlightenment’ means. It is here a surprisingly optimistic concept. In the 
capitalist present, thought may have lost its self-reflexivity and today’s ma-
chines may mutilate their operators, but ‘in the form of machines… alienated 
reason moves towards a society which reconciles thought [in its reified 
forms, namely material and intellectual apparatuses]… with the liberated liv-
ing beings’ (1987: 60-61). It is important to note that emancipatory hope lies 
not in the actuality of thought in bourgeois society (and likewise, the ac-
tuality of machines and other things) but the ability to have thoughts (and to 
translate science into machines) as such. The overall argument of Dialectic 
of Enlightenment makes abundantly clear that the actuality of thought in 
bourgeois society ― the double monarchy of positivism and the wrong, 
namely authoritarian, kind of metaphysics ― in fact thwarts the possibilities 
of thought. Nevertheless, in spite of it all, enlightenment has not lost its in-
nate emancipatory potential which is grounded objectively in the nature of 
thought. 
Unsurprisingly, Horkheimer and Adorno instantly pour cold water on the 
hints of optimism in this account of reification by pointing out how ‘the rul-
ers’ react to the objective openness of the historical situation: smelling the 
rat, ‘the rulers’ denounce reason itself as ideology, which brings the dis-
cussion back to one of the book’s leitmotifs, the attack on (Comtean as well 
as ‘logical’) positivism. The ruling ‘cliques’ (fascist, proto-fascist, quasi-fas-
cist, and now post-fascist) have abandoned rationalist justifications of their 
‘misdeeds’ and use instead the rhetoric of intuitions, mission and destiny, 
posturing ‘as the engineers of world history’ (1987: 61). Horkheimer and 
Adorno conclude this paragraph with a reflection on productivity, power and 
class in contemporary capitalism:
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Now that the livelihood of those still needed to operate the machines can be 
produced with a minimal part of the labour time which the masters of society 
have at their disposal, the superfluous…mass of the population…are drilled as 
additional guards of the system, so that they can be used today and tomorrow 
as material for its grand designs…Misery as the antithesis of power and im-
potence is growing immeasurably, in tandem with the capacity permanently to 
abolish any misery (1987: 61-62).
Thinking about thinking is central to critical theory that constitutes an ex-
ercise in self-reflection: enlightenment’s enlightenment. Horkheimer and 
Adorno state sarcastically that ‘the reason of the reasonable society’ is not in 
fact reasonable (it is so only in the sense in which the father orders his chil-
dren ‘to be reasonable, or else’). The good news is that this system’s in-
evitability is only an illusion; the bad news is that thinking that is societally 
constituted ‘as an instrument of domination’ cannot dissolve this illusion 
(1987: 62). There is no such thing as a type of in itself emancipatory 
thinking. Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument is rather that the nature of 
thinking as such points beyond its own social-historical constitution and the 
limitations that it brings. Thinking cannot escape the entanglement that 
keeps it ‘ensnared in prehistory’ (the struggle for self-preservation), but at 
least it can understand that we escaped nature only by means of being very 
much like nature. We have not yet transcended nature, and in this sense we 
are not human ― humane ― yet, and we know it somehow, due to the relent-
lessness of thinking itself: unstoppably consistent thinking, thinking about it-
self, relentless in this respect like nature, cannot stop short of recognizing, 
and then challenging, its own nature-like character. Thinking produces a 
kind of overflow that enables it to reflect on itself. Its steady trickle is the ba-
sis of humanity’s hope for emancipation. Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept 
of dialectics precludes any attempt to separate the good bits of enlighten-
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ment from the bad bits, though: enlightenment is emancipatory and liberat-
ing only through its instrumental and dominating aspects, that is, its 
reification.
Hope lies in the fact that thought may be a product of society but is still 
not entirely reduced to its social function: ‘…true praxis capable of over-
turning the state of things depends on theory’s intransigence against the co-
matose state in which society allows thought to ossify’ (65). It seems that 
those scattered bits of thought that escaped reification ― such as critical 
theory, perhaps, or else literature and art that refuse to be pleasant and amus-
ing ― can, by being intransigent, inform ‘true praxis’ that will shake society 
out of the coma that makes thought ossify. Here Horkheimer and Adorno 
add an attack on the (then as now) influential conservative ‘critique of civi-
lization’: ‘Fulfilment is not jeopardized by the material preconditions of ful-
filment, unfettered technology as such’. The question of technology is not 
the ‘supreme’ question but the wrong one as ‘the fault lies with a social con-
text that induces delusional blindness [gesellschaftlicher Verblendungszu-
sammenhang]’. The ‘mythic-scientific respect that people all over the world 
pay to what the given facts are’ has become ‘a fortress before which even the 
revolutionary imagination despises itself as utopianism and degenerates to 
the compliant trust in the objective tendency of history’. Horkheimer and 
Adorno encourage here ‘the revolutionary imagination’ not to capitulate be-
fore the positivistic fetishization of facts: ‘The spirit of a theory that is in-
transigently formulated in this perspective might be able to turn around that 
of merciless progress when it has run its course’ (1987: 65).
In the last paragraph of ‘The concept of Enlightenment’ Horkheimer and 
Adorno are explicit about the source of their optimism: they state that ‘the 
bourgeois economy’ has multiplied Gewalt (a German word that means vio-
lence, power, force and/or domination) ‘through the mediation of the mar-
ket’, but in the same process has also ‘multiplied its things and forces 
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[Kräfte] to such an extent that their administration no longer requires kings, 
nor even the bourgeois themselves: it only needs all. They learn from the 
power [Macht] of things finally to forgo domination [Macht]’ (1987: 66). 
This sentence, written in the midst of WWII and the Holocaust, is nothing 
less than astonishing: in spite of seemingly overwhelming darkness, we can 
learn from the reified forms of enlightenment ― the stuff of civilization: 
knowledge, science, technology, social-organisational forms ― that we can 
abolish the domination to which the enlightenment has been wedded for sev-
eral tens of thousands of years. Nevertheless, ‘it only needs all’ must be the 
understatement of the century.
On close reading, and considering the historical context, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is much more ‘Mountain Hut Halfway House’ than ‘Grand 
Hotel Abyss’, where Georg Lukács famously lodged the Frankfurt School in 
the 1962 preface to his Theory of the Novel (Lukács, 1971: 22). Francis 
Bacon’s early-enlightenment utopia that ‘we should command nature in ac-
tion’ (quoted in Horkheimer and Adorno 1987, 26) has revealed itself as the 
nightmarish domination of nature, human and non-human, within society as 
much as without. In the process, though, human knowledge has increased so 
much that it can finally begin to dissolve domination for good. 
Unsurprisingly, the optimism of this account of what humanity can ach-
ieve is dampened in the last sentence of ‘The concept of enlightenment’ that 
points forward to the discussion of ‘culture industry’ in the fourth chapter: 
‘But in face of this possibility enlightenment, in the service of the present, is 
turning itself into total deception of the masses’ (1987: 66). Horkheimer and 
Adorno assert that ‘the increase in economic productivity… creates the con-
ditions for a more just world’, which is an orthodox Marxian perspective as 
much as that of liberal modernization theory. What the liberals tend to em-
phasize much less is that progress in productivity at the same time tremen-
dously increases the social power of those who control production. 
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Individuals are better provided for than ever before, but they ‘vanish before 
the apparatus they serve’ (20). This state of things is completed by ‘the fla-
shy and noisy propagation of spirit [der gleißnerischen Verbreitung des 
Geistes]’: while spirit’s true concern is the ‘negation of reification’ (20), the 
spread of reified spirit ― i.e. culture in the form of things and commodities: 
Kulturgut ― kills off spirit and with it the hope for the better state of things. 
‘The flood of precise information and brand-new amusements makes people 
smarter and more stupid at once’ (20), which is of course a statement nowa-
days agreed upon by any number of commentators on mobile phone-based 
information technology. Horkheimer and Adorno emphasize, though, that 
their concern is not the same as that of the conservative Kulturkritiker, the 
‘critics of civilization’ who promote ‘culture as a value’: the ‘selling out of 
culture’ would not in itself be particularly deplorable. The point is that it 
helps ‘converting the economic achievements into their opposite’ (21). The 
critique of the reification and self-destruction of spirit is meant to help hu-
manity reap ‘the economic achievements’ of human civilization and its latest 
incarnation, the capitalist economy: by transcending the latter we can make 
civilization attractive to all and thus defeat fascism and other delusions. The 
difficulty hereby is that only the reified forms of spirit can overcome spirit’s 
reification.
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❒ 국문초록
사물의 권력에서 배우기: 호르크하이머와 아도르노의 
󰡔계몽의 변증법󰡕에서의 노동, 문명 그리고 해방
마르셀 스토엣즐러
이 글은 막스 호르크하이머와 테오도어 아도르노의 대표적인 저서 󰡔계몽의 
변증법󰡕(1947)에 대한 새로운 독해를 제안한다. 호르크하이머와 아도르노는 근
대의 자유주의적, 인간적, 사회적 진보가 새로운 형태의 야만주의로 넘어갔다
는 관찰을 출발점으로 삼았지만, 이를 계몽주의와 그 가치에 대한, 보통 말하는 
그런 거부로 발전시키는 것은 명백히 거부했다. 그 대신에 변증법적 관점은 문
명이 실패하는 가장 어두운 순간, 홀로코스트에서 전형적으로 보이는 순간에서
조차도 인류문명의 자기반성적이고 더욱 계몽된 형태를 방어해야 할 이유를 찾
으려 시도한다. 변증법적 이론은 자유주의 및 사회주의 이론의 대부분에서 중
심적인 것으로 남아 있는 진보라는 아이디어를 거부하지 않고 재정립한다. 중
심적인 질문 중 하나는 어떠한 조건하에서 과학적·기술적 이성과 사회적 조직 
및 일반적 생산성을 포함하는 계몽주의와 문명의 도구들이 해방 또는 야만주의 
어느 하나에 복무하는가이다. 어떠한 형태의 형이상학과 유토피아적 사고에 대
한 실증주의적 공격을 피하면서, 호르크하이마와 아도르노는 지배보다는 해방
을 위해 비경험적인, 현실을 초월하는, 비판적인 사고에 기초한 계몽주의의 필
요성을 강조했다. 인간의 정신은 운동(movement)의 자유가 박탈되었을 때 위축
된다. 󰡔계몽의 변증법󰡕의 더 추상적이고 철학적인 논증은 몇몇 더 역사적으로 
구체적인 소재를 통해 발전하는데, 그중 하나는 근대의 반유대주의에 관한 해
석이다. 호르크하이머와 아도르노는 이러한 맥락에서, 근대 사회관계의 상품 
형태와 임금 형태 개념에 기초해 자유주의와 파시스트적 거버넌스 사이의 연속
성 측면을 다룬 마르크스주의적 분석과 포그롬(pogrom) 및 제노사이드
(genocide)를 ‘문명의 의례(rituals)’로 보는 인류학적 해석을 결합시킨다. 문명은 
노동으로부터 인간 삶의 해방을 목표로 하지만, 이는 노동, 규율, 정체성을 조
직하고 강화시키는 방법, 사고를 간소화시키고 파괴시키는 방법뿐만 아니라 분
노를 일으키는 방법을 통해서 이루어진다. 따라서 문명은 더 ‘원시적인’ 문명 
단계를 대표하는 것으로 여겨지는 사람들과 문명을 추진하는 것으로 여겨지는 
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사람들 모두에게서 맹렬한 분노를 생산한다. 그럼에도 호르크하이마와 아도르
노는 계몽주의 그 자체가 스스로의 함정을 극복할 수단을 생산한다고 주장한
다. 계몽주의가 생산하는 ‘힘과 사물’은 지배관계를 제공할 뿐만 아니라 인간이 
지배관계를 극복할 수 있도록 고무한다. 지배수단(특히 지식)의 물화는 권력을 
조정하고, 완화시키며, 잠재적으로는 민주화시킨다.
주요 용어: 아도르노, 소외, 반유대주의, 자본주의, 문명, 오귀스트 콩트, 
해방, 계몽주의, 파시즘, 호르크하이머, 존 키츠, 노동, 자유주의, 마술, 샤
를 모라스, 형이상학, 미메시스, 실증주의, 이성, 물화, 사회주의, 기술
